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GILDING THE IRON RICE BOWL: THE ILLUSION OF
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS IN CHINA
Matthew D. Latimer
Abstract: In the late 1970s, the People's Republic of China (P.RC.) embarked upon a
program of economic reform that has resulted in the issuance of equity securities in previously
state-owned enterprises. with the recent advent of national stockmarkets, national securities
legislation is emerging to supplement and further define prior local-level regulation. Despite
these new laws, however, private investors still lack many of the protections enjoyed by
investors in Western financial markets. This Comment examines these disparities and
suggests that non-state investors in China's nascent financial markets still lack an effective
means of overseeing the policy decisions of State-owned corporations and face difficulties in
obtaining redress from fraudulent conduct within the marketplace. Moreover, this Comment
argues that the status of ownership rights in China's socialist system still is uncertain. This
Comment then proposes a program which would diversify state interests in enterprises that
would be both satisfying politically and encouraging of further reform.

Translated literally, the Chinese word for "investor" (touzizhe) is one
who throws or tosses capital.' Given the current state of Chinese
securities legislation, this translation may not be far off the mark. Since
the opening of national stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen in
December 1990 and July 1991 respectively, 2 literally thousands of
Chinese and foreign investors have been clamouring for the chance to
"toss" their fortunes into these emerging markets
Unfortunately,
China's securities laws have failed to keep pace with the significant
growth of its burgeoning securities industry. Although legislation
continues to be enacted, China's current laws fail to offer adequate levels
of shareholder protection or to ensure that outside shareholders4 will be
able to oversee and direct the governance of Chinese enterprises. 5
1. A Nev Chinese-EnglishDictionary1024 (1985).
2. Not all areas in China have the authority to establish national securities exchanges. Shenzhen
has been designated by China's central government as a "special economic zone" (SEZ) which is
given special autonomy in the area of economic liberalization. Shanghai is a "directly administered
city" that, like provinces, is under the direct control of the central government.
3. For example, when three newly-quoted Shenzhen companies issued shares in August 1992,
approximately one million potential Chinese investors showed up to register for the opportunity to
purchase them. And during the summer of 1992, Western investors "tossed" upwards of $1.5 billion
into Chinese mutual funds. See, e.g., David Fairlamb, Surging, Churning China, Institutional
Investor, Jan. 1993, at 33. See also Robert Steiner & Robert McGough, Mutual Interest: Investment
Funds Let Individuals with the Capitaland the Courage Get in on the Action, Wall St. J., Dec. 10,
1993, at R17.
4. Currently, three major classes of shares are available in China: "A" shares which are held
exclusively by Chinese nationals, "B" shares which are held exclusively by foreign individuals and
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This Comment examines the rights available to outside shareholders
under China's current regulatory framework, as well as the methods and
procedures currently in place to enforce those rights. Specifically, this
Comment addresses three significant areas of potential concern: the
ability of shareholders to oversee management decis:ion-making through
voting power, the ability of investors to obtain adequate redress from
fraudulent conduct in the marketplace, and the feasability of private
stock ownership in a socialist system. Part I provides an overview of the
historical development of China's modem stock system and an
explanation of China's current regulatory regime. Part II analyzes the
specific rights afforded shareholders under China's regulatory
framework and suggests that there are significant gaps within that
framework that should concern potential investors. Part III outlines a
proposal that helps bridge these gaps and provides a direction for further
reform.
I. CHINA'S STOCK SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW
A. HistoricalDevelopment
Modem economic reform in China began in 1979. Up until then,
China's economy had been subject to varying levels of government
planning since the 1949 Communist Revolution.6 Consequently, budget
allocations from the national government were the sole source of
funding 7 for all state-owned enterprises. The establishment of securities
markets was a natural outgrowth of the economic reforms begun in 1979
when the central government, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping,
instituted the "Four Modernizations" program to increase China's

funds, and "State" shares which, as the name suggests, are held by the state organ that is the major
shareholder in the enterprise. See, e.g., Julia W. Sze, The Allure of B Shares, China Bus. Rev.,
Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 42.; Roberta S. Karmel, Tossing Capitalism in Shanghai, N.Y. L. J., Aug. 19,
1993, at 3. In this Comment, "outside shareholders" refers to holders of A and B shares.
5. As used in this Comment, the term "enterprise" encompasses all state-owned and collectivelyowned entities that engage in business.
6. Contrary to popular belief, China's economy has never been completely planned from the
center. Unlike the former Soviet Union, in which over 60,000 comrodities were planned and
distributed, in China this figure has rarely exceeded several hundred. Donald C. Clarke, What's Law
Got to Do with It? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 1,
5-6 (1991).
7. Jia Zhao and Li Qian, TradingStocks in China:Development Regulation, Issues and Prospects,
E. Asian Exec. Rep., June 1992, at 7.
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competitiveness in the world market.' The advent of securities markets in
China stemmed primarily from a need to obtain new sources of capital
for Chinese industry and to relieve the state's financial organs from the
burden of finding investment funds for projects designated by the central
government. 9 A secondary purpose of the "privatization" program was
to encourage reinvestment of the estimated 1.2 trillion (Renminbi) in
accumulated savings by private individuals."
Consequently, in 1981, government treasury bonds were issued for the
first time, and by 1984, select enterprises had been given permission to
reorganize as joint stock companies and to issue equity securities in
addition to bonds."1 By the late 1980s, China's central government had
recognized that private issuance of stocks and bonds to investors was an
effective way to raise the capital necessary for production 2 ; however,
fear of losing control of the economy prompted the State Council 3 to
limit the types of enterprises that could issue stock.'4 Despite these
limits, in 1986, the Shenyang Jinbei Auto Industrial Shareholding
Corporation"5 became the first state-owned enterprise reorganized as a
shareholding company to issue shares to the public.' 6 The approval of
this share subscription by the Central Bank signified a substantial change

8. Zhou Enlai, Report on the Work of Government, (delivered at the Fourth National People's
Congress) reprinted in Beijing Review, Jan. 24, 1975, at 21-5. The goal of the "Four
Modernizations" policy is to provide China with modem agriculture, industry, national defense, and
science and technology by the year 2000.
9. Li Guixian, former president of the People's Bank of China (PBOC), has stated, "We can sell a
number of enterprises or the stocks of some large state enterprises to reduce state investment and
loans and lessen the burdens of the state and the enterpises." Dorothy J. Solinger, Capitalist
Measureswith Chinese Characteristics,Problems of Communism, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 42.
10. David Fairlamb, supra note 3, at 33, 35. Experts believe twice that amount is hidden in
Chinese mattresses, bringing the savings ratio close to 45%. Id.
11. Paul Schroeder, Rebuilding China'sSecuritiesMarkets, China Bus. Rev., May-June 1991, at
20.
12. Zhao & Qian, supranote 7, at 7, 8.
13. The State Council functions as the Executive branch of the Chinese government and has
principle control over economic policy. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
14. Directive of the State Council on Reinforcement of Administration on Stocks and Bonds,
March 28, 1987. This directive sets forth three basic principles: (1) Only collective enterprises may
issue stock; (2) state enterprises, upon approval, may issue bonds and debentures; and (3)
shareholding joint ventures among state-owned enterprises through "stock for asset" transfer may
not issue stock to the public.
15. Jinbei Automotive has since been listed on the New York Stock Exchange through a
Bermudian Holding Company, Brilliance China Automotive Holdings Ltd. See generally Lee B.
Spencer Jr. & Clark T. Randt Jr., A Dragon Enters the Den of Capitalism, Bus. Law Today,
Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 22.
16. Zhao & Qian, supra note 7, at 8.
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in policy among China's regulators, thus allowing any state-owned
enterprise that had
reorganized into a shareholding company to publicly
17
issue securities.
Also during the 1980s, regional securities exchanges began operating
in areas such as Shanghai, Beijing, Shenyang, Wuhan, Tianjin,
Chongqing, Guangzhou, Harbin, and Shenzhen.
Although these
exchanges were strictly regional and dealt almost exclusively in
enterprise bond issues with fixed interest rates and no ownership rights, 8
their existence gave rise to several previously unaddressed issues, such as
the precise nature of ownership rights in a socialist slockholding system
and the reconciling the disparate treatment among state and collective
enterprises. There was also rampant speculation among private investors
and disagreement among governing agencies over the types of securities
that could be issued-all of which served to dampen investor
enthusiasm. The establishment of national exchanges in Shanghai and
Shenzhen at the beginning of the 1990s eventually served to quell some,
but not all, of the problems associated with the scattered exchanges.
Currently, the Shanghai and Shenzhen national exchanges are
enjoying wide investor interest both within and outside of China. As of
December 1993, there are approximately 240 companies listed on the
two exchanges combined, 9 and 34 China funds2" available world-wide
with over $1.5 billion in assets.2" Leading securities analysts are
increasingly confident about the ultimate success cf China's securities
markets 2
B. Existing Law
Despite these impressive beginnings, the recent advent of securities
markets in China has resulted in a paucity, by Western standards, of
legislation controlling market operations, although new legislation is
being enacted on a continuing basis. To understand the context in which
this legislation arises, it is important to understand the framework of the
legislative system in the P.R.C.
17. Id.
18. Paul Schroeder, Rebuilding China'sSecurities Markets, China Bus. Rev., May-June 1991, at
20.
19. Andrew Quinn, China: China Sees Careful Growth Key to Stock Success, Rueters News
Service, Feb. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS News Library, Non-US Nears file.
20. These funds are mutual funds that focus their investment on Chinese companies.
21. Steiner, supranote 3, at R17.
22. See Fairlamb, supra note 10, at 34.
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1. ConstitutionalStructure
Under China's constitution, the National People's Congress (NPC)3
and its Standing Committee are the supreme holders of state power.
Beneath the N-PC are four state branches nominally responsible to it: the
Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the
Supreme People's Court, and the State Council. 24 Though officially all
national legislation is passed through the NPC or its Standing
Committee, most laws are drafted by various regional administrative
offices or by the State Council.' In addition, the State Council has been
specifically authorized to enact regulations and laws to implement
national laws affecting the economy26 and economic reform.27 These
laws, though confined to the administration of government, are national
in scope.
At the regional level, Regional People's Congresses are empowered to
enact legislation to implement or supplement national laws or
administrative regulations and to deal with specific local problems.28
Like the State Council, regional governments may also enact
administrative regulations for their regions." This paradigm continues
down to local governments at the city or township level. Special
economic zones, such as Shenzhen, enjoy unique grants of legislative
power from the central government due to their peculiar economic status
and are afforded greater latitude in dealing with specific local economic
problems. °

23. P.R.C. Const. art. 57-59 (adopted Dec. 4, 1982 by the 5th Session of the 5th National
People's Congress).
24. Id. at arts. 92, 94, 128, 133. The State Council is responsible for the administration of the
national government. Keller, supra note 23, at 669.
25. Perry Keller, Legislation in the People'sRepublic of China, 23 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 653,
664.
26. Resolution on the Government Work Report, May 31, 1984 (adopted by 2d Session of the 6th
National People's Congress).
27. Decision Concerning the Delegation of Authority to the State Council to enact Temporary
Regulations Regarding Economic Reform and the Opening to Foreign Countries, April, 1985
(adopted by the 3d Session of the 6th National People's Congress).
28. P.R.C. Const. art. 7,38, 51.
29. Keller, supra note 25, at 681.
30. Id.
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2. China'sLegislative Process3
China's legislative process 32 differs significantly from lawmaking in
the United States. Observers trained in common law are often puzzled
by the abstract generality of China's statutes and by :he lack of guidance
on how legislation is to be implemented. In this respect, it is important
to note that in the Chinese system, legislation is typically directed toward
members of the vast government bureaucracy, whose responsibility is to
implement the policies set forth in the legislative document itself.
Consequently, most interpretation is left to the local implementing
governmental body, which establishes internal rules to further the
purposes set forth in the original legislation. 3' These internal rules,
however, are often not available to the general pubLic, and hence, give
rise to considerable confusion for anyone trying to gain an understanding
of an existing regulatory framework.
Thus, an analysis of Chinese securities laws must consider not only
relevant national legislation, but also provincial and 'local legislation and
rules. Though a national system of securities regulation is beginning to
emerge, regional and local regulations still dominate the regulatory
landscape and most likely will continue to do so in the near future.
Therefore, in considering the rights afforded shareholders under China's
current regulatory framework, it will be necessary to consider three
distinct bodies of law: the national securities regulations, the Shenzhen
securities regulations, and the Shanghai securities regulations.
3. China'sSecurities Laws
a. The NationalSecurities Law
National securities laws are a relatively new development in China
and, as a result, continue to evolve. Prior to 1992, market regulation was
exclusively in the control of the Guangdong Provincial Government and
the local governments and securities exchanges of Shenzhen and
3 1. For a more detailed explanation of the Chinese legislative process, see generally id.
32. For the purposes of this article, "legislation" refers to any laws, rules, regulations, directives,
and other rule-making documents promulgated by national, provincial, ard local governments.
33. For example, the National People's Congress might enact a statute requiring that all
restaurants in China engage in sanitary food preparation practices. Local municipal or provincial
governments would then promulgate specific laws governing the standards with which restaurants in
their jurisdiction would need to comply. At the lowest level, administrators may author detailed
rules governing enforcement actions.
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Shanghai.34 Though the new national regulations provide an "outline for
the national system of securities regulation that is likely to emerge over
the next few years,"35 much must be accomplished before a
comprehensive national system of regulation is established.
The Trial Measures on Share-Formulated Enterprises (the Share
Enterprise Measures), the outline for all future national measures, were
promulgated by the State Council in May 1992.36 The Share Enterprise
Measures provide the general objectives of stock-issuing enterprises and
the principles by which the national securities markets are to be
governed.3" The Share Enterprise Measures and the regulations that
followed have provided, for the first time, a national regulatory
foundation for the development of China's securities markets.
In addition to the Share Enterprise Measures, the State Council has
promulgated several other significant pieces of legislation. In January
1993 the State Council issued a circular 38 creating the Securities
Committee of the State Council (SCOSC) and its subordinate organ, the
China Securities Supervision and Control Committee (CSSACC). The
SCOSC is to be the source of regulatory and policy decisions while the
CSSACC is charged with implementing and supervising the enforcement
of the SCOSC's decisions.39
Three final pieces of national legislation promulgated by the State
Council-the Provisional Regulations on the Administration of the
Issuing and Trading of Stocks," Provisional Measures governing Stock
Exchanges,41 and Interim Procedures for Prohibiting Securities
Fraud 42 -have more fully defined the procedures for orderly
34. Guangdong Province, in the Southeastern comer of China, contains the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone and Shanghai. However, Shanghai is a specially administered city that takes its
primary direction from the national government.
35. Pitman B. Potter, Securities Regulation:A NationalSystem Begins to Emerge, E. Asian Exec.
Rep., May 1993, at 9.
36. Trial Measures on Share-Formulated Enterprises, translated in
Foreign Business-Business Regulation, (CCH-Austl., Ltd. 1993).

13-570 China Laws For

37. Id. at 13-570(2)(1-5).
38. State Council Circularon Macro-Control of Securities Markets, FBIS Daily Report-China,
Jan. 25, 1993, at 24.
39. Id.
40. Provisional Regulations on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks,
translatedin China Laws on Foreign Business 13-754 (CCH-Austrl., Ltd. 1993)
41. ProvisionalMeasures Governing Stock Exchanges, July 7, 1993, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, C1 (special supplement).
42. Interim Proceduresfor ProhibitingSecurities Fraud,September 2, 1993, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts.
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administration of securities markets in China. It is expected that more
national legislation will follow. Though still far from comprehensive,
these recent pieces of legislation have begun to provide a framework for
China's national securities system.
b. Local Laws
Though sketchy by U.S. standards, by far the raost comprehensive
securities regulation in China takes place at the local level. Two
principal sources of China's securities law are the regulations and rules
promulgated by the municipal governments of Shanghai and Shenzhen.4 3
While both sets of regulations attempt to maintain orderly markets and to
protect the interests of investors,' the two measures have taken different
approaches to achieve these results.
These varying approaches are reflected in the two primary pieces of
legislation that regulate these markets: the Provisional Measures of
Shenzhen Municipality on Share Issuing and Trading (Shenzhen
Measures) 45 and the Administrative Measures of Shanghai Municipality
Governing Securities Trading (Shanghai Measures).46 The Shenzhen
Measures delineate the requirements for public issuance of stock and
provide detailed regulations on how approval for such issuance is to be
The Shanghai Measures, by contrast, simply list the
obtained.
documents to be submitted in order to qualify as an issuer47 and have less
specific requirements for prospectus contents. 48 The result is that, while
it is easier initially to list stocks in Shanghai, investors there face greater
uncertainty in the stability of the issuing institution than their
counterparts in Shenzhen.
Moreover, both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Measures provide for
investor protection against fraud, but each approaches the issue
differently. Shanghai, in addition to imposing administrative fines for
distributing false or misleading information,4 9 has provided a private
43. The municipalities of Shanghai and Shenzhen are the present locations of China's two
existing securities markets.
44. See Shanghai Measures art. 1 and Shenzhen Measures art. 1.
45. Provisional Measures of Shenzhen Municipality on Share Issuing and Trading (1991),
translatedin China Laws for Foreign Business 73-553 (CCH Austl. LtL 1992).
46. Administrative Measures of Shanghai Municipality Governing Securities Trading (1990),
translatedin China Laws for Foreign Business 91-038 (CCH Austl. Ltd. 1992).
47. Shanghai Measures art. 9, 10.
48. Id. atart. 16.
49. Shanghai Measures art. 75(3).
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cause of action to the aggrieved shareholder.5 Shenzhen, on the other
hand, only imposes a variety of administrative and criminal penalties for
fraudulent conduct.5' Both Shenzhen and Shanghai have supplemented
these basic statutes with other measures governing various aspects of
regulating the new markets. However, despite the growing compendium
of national and local securities laws, some fundamental shareholder
interests remain unprotected.
II.

CHINA'S CURRENT SECURITIES REGULATIONS FAIL TO
PROTECT BASIC SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS

Despite the new national regulations and the body of existing
regulations in Shanghai and Shenzhen, individual shareholders in
Chinese companies still do not enjoy the basic shareholder protections
available to investors in the United States. Consequently, holding shares
in these institutions can expose investors to considerable risk. The lack
of these protections can be attributed in part to China's relative
inexperience in regulating securities markets and in part to historical,
economic, and political forces.5 2 Nevertheless, if China is to continue its
economic reforms and maintain the integrity of its securities markets, it
must provide protection to the individual shareholders who provide the
capital fuel for the economic machine. This Comment identifies three
primary problems that must be addressed before securities markets can
achieve lasting stability in China: inadequate shareholder oversight of
management decisions, lack of a reliable source of redress, and the
inherent resistance to reform spawned by the ambiguities relating to
private ownership that are embedded in the Chinese Constitution,
statutes, and ideology.
A. ShareholderSuffrage
China's current securities regulations fail to vest outside shareholders
with the ability to oversee and influence management personnel. In the
50. Shanghai Measures art. 20.
51. Shenzhen Measures art. 87.
52. For example, one commentator has suggested that it may be a mistake to view China's rulemaking environment as a "legal system" at all. Instead it might more profitably be analyzed as a
"disciplinary system" like that of the military. The fundamental purpose of a legal system is to
secure the freedom and rights of individuals within the society. A disciplinary system's purpose, on
the other hand, is to establish order and to promote the purposes of the institution it serves. Viewing
China's regulatory environment under the disciplinary model may explain why the laws are so
hesitant to establish rights for individual investors. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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United States, shareholders have the right to elect the directors of a
corporation,5 3 vote on extraordinary corporate matters,54 and remove
directors for cause." In China, these rights either do not exist at all, or
are so limited that they are de facto nonexistent. This inability to check
the actions of management through voting power deprives outside
shareholders of their collective voice and leaves their interests
underrepresented.
Ideally, stock ownership would confer upon shareholders the right to
participate in the major policy decisions of the enterprise and to select
the leadership of the enterprise through director eleclions. Although the
recently promulgated Company Law does provide for shareholder voting
rights5 6 and annual shareholder meetings,57there is still little opportunity
for an outside shareholder to exercise influence over management. This
is because when a prospective issuer goes public, the state organ
responsible for its management generally only sells 25% of all stock
available, and in no case does it sell more than 50%.58 Thus, the state
ultimately maintains control of the company's policies, directors, and
operations despite the fact that private individuals, both domestic and
foreign, share in the ownership.
The obvious problem is that the outside shareholders' interest in
making a profitable investment may not always be consistent with the
ultimate interests of the state majority shareholder. For example, the
state may not have an incentive to pursue goals consistent with
increasing the profitability of the corporation.5 9 In fhct, it may actually
53. Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, The Laws of Corporations511 (1983).
54. Id. at491.
55. Id. at 512.
56. P.R.C. Company Law art. 41 (adopted at the 5th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th
National People's Congress, promulgated on 29 December 1993 and effective as of July 1, 1994).
57. Id. at art. 104.
58. Roberta S. Karmel, Tossing Capitalism in Shanghai, N.Y. L.I., Aug. 19, 1993, at 33.
However, recent developments suggest that the state is having difficulty maintaining this dominant
position. For example, Shandong Petrochemical recently offered each shareholder the option to buy
8 new shares for every 10 shares held. Among the major shareholders, only the state failed to
exercise its option, shrinking its stake from 51.2% to 38%. Keven Murphy, Chinese Firms Slipping
Into PrivateHands, Int'l Herald Trib., Apr. 19, 1994, at Al.
59. For instance, some enterprises may be used simply to manufacture raw components for other
state enterprises. Profitability of the supplier may not be as important to the state as the allocation of
enough components to the other enterprise. Because the state owns at least 50% of both companies,
it will simply make an internal evaluation of the costs and benefits and make a decision on pricing,
payment, and production costs. This evaluation may not take into account outside investors'
interests. Likewise, enterprises whose principal shareholder is a municipal or provincial government
agency may choose to overstaff their factory in order to reduce unemployment in the local area.
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sacrifice the enterprise's profitability to achieve other state objectives. 0
The result is that unwitting outside shareholders place their investment in
the hands of government bureaucrats 61 who may be pursuing goals which
are inconsistent with shareholder expectations.
Successful securities regulation in China must address this problem.
Although some investors, at the present time, may feel that they are fairly
represented by enterprise leadership, investor confidence in China's
securities markets ultimately will depend on the ability of shareholders to
exercise some degree of oversight over enterprise management. Lack of
specific provisions mandating shareholder participation in deciding
enterprise policies, coupled with ultimate control of share enterprises by
the state, effectively places the outside shareholder at the mercy of the
state's plans.
B. Limited Rights of Redress
Although current national and regional regulations provide basic
definitions of securities fraud and allow compensation to the victim, the
regulations ultimately fail to define exactly what type of action should be
taken to secure that compensation, or in many instances, to specify
whether a private right of action is available at all. Additionally, Chinese
courts have been notoriously inconsistent in enforcing awards,
particularly when an award would harm an interest of a major contributor
to the regional economy.
To understand the reasons behind the
relative absence of private rights of action in China, it is important to
first understand the overall philosophy of China's dispute resolution
system.

60. For example, the "state plans" required by formal socialist ideology might simply be replaced
by inequitable "state contracts," whereby the former quotas are now sales orders offered to the state
at a reduced price. Though it is unclear whether there is any shareholder "duty of loyalty" under
Chinese law, it is probable that such a duty, in practice, could not be applied to the State
successfully.
61. These may be the enterprise's directors or other managerial officials appointed by a
"competent authority" designated by the majority state shareholder or employee representatives.
Henry R. Zheng, Business Organizationand SecuritiesLaws of the People'sRepublic of China, 43
Bus. Law 551, 559 (1988). As a result, there is no guarantee that they have outside shareholders'
profit interests at heart.
62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
63. Matthew D. Bersani, The Enforcement of ArbitrationAwards In China, J. of Int'l. Arb., June
1993, at 47-48.
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1. Chinese Philosophyof Law and "'Rights"
Most commentators agree that it is not entirely accurate to describe
China's system of rules and regulations as a "legal" system: rather, it
might better be described as a "disciplinary" system.' Under a legal
system, the emphasis is on justice and securing the rights of the
individual. A disciplinary system, on the other hand, strives to maintain
order, to achieve common objectives, and to quell disputes.
For example, most traditional American families operate under a
disciplinary system. The supreme holders of authority are the parents.
When making rules for family members, the focus is typically on what
will most benefit that family as a whole, with the needs of its individual
members being secondary. Rarely is the focus on vesting children with
irrevocable rights that limit the parents' authority. Such is the general
nature of China's disciplinary system. Law typically does not create
private rights for individuals; rather, it is the method by which the state
asserts its "parental" authority to discipline anyone who may hinder the
state's ultimate goals.65
2.

ShareholderCompensationProvisions

Because China has traditionally followed a disciplinary model of rule
enforcement, its legislation typically has not provided rights to its
citizens that may be privately enforced. Violations of national or
regional securities laws generally subject violators only to fines or
imprisonment and not to civil liability. Nevertheless, some of China's
securities laws have made an attempt to define private causes of action.
Both the national66 and Shanghai regulations67 call for the payment of
compensation to injured parties in the event of issuer fraud, though they

64. See generally Thomas B. Stevens, OrderandDisciplinein China (1992).
65. See id. at 8. Stevens states that most Eastern commentators have considered Chinese justice to
be "parental" rather than "adjudicative."
66. Provisional Regulations on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks (1993)
translatedin China Laws for Foreign Business 113-574 (CCH-Austl. Ltd. 1993)
67. Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration of the Trmding of Securities (1990).
Under these regulations, an issuer may be personally liable for any damages incurred by a
shareholder resulting from a false or misleading prospectus. However, anlike U.S. securities law,
liability is contingent upon actual knowledge of the false or misleading statement, rather than upon
negligence. See Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e).
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fail to define exactly what constitutes a fraudulent act.68 The Shenzhen
regulations, on the other hand, treat -a violation of the disclosure
obligation like any other technical violation, by imposing penalties such
as criticism in the newspaper, a fine of up to 10,000 yuan, 69 and a
temporary suspension of quoted trading of its stocks. 0 However,
because the national regulations technically preempt all local regulations,
the national requirement that compensation be paid to those injured by
fraudulent statements will likely hold true in Shenzhen as well.7'
The difficulty with the current regulations is that they fail to define
causes of action with specificity. For example, article 20 of the Shanghai
Measures states that fraudulent statements or omissions by an issuer shall
result in liability for "compensation." Just what is meant by this term is
unclear. Perhaps this problem will be solved during the coming years as
the national and local governments further experiment with new policies
and legislation. However, in the interim, the possibility that a
shareholder will be able to bring a successful private action under the
current vague provisions is questionable.
3. Difficulty with Enforcement
A second, perhaps more onerous bar to redress of shareholder
grievances in China is the limited power of Chinese courts to enforce
their judgments. Alhough in theory China's court system is independent
from other government institutions, in reality a court's power to enforce
its judgments depends upon cooperation from local banks, Public
Security Bureaus, 2 and political leaders. Varying relationships between
the court, the heads of these local organizations, and the party against
whom judgment is being sought often inhibit satisfactory resolution for
the plaintiff.
For example, management of large enterprises in China has
traditionally been assumed by members of the Communist Party. Indeed,
Party leadership is constitutionally guaranteed and is one of the

68. Regulations of the Shanghai Municipality on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of
Stocks, art. 39 (1990); see also Pitman B. Potter, Shanghai Securities Regulations, E. Asian Exec.
Rep., August 1991, at 10.
69. This amount equals approximately $1,154 U.S. dollars.
70. Zhao & Qian, supranote 7, at 10.
71. Keller, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
72. The Public Security Bureau is comparable, though not identical, to a local police department
in the United States.
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fundamental principles of the current political system.73 Therefore, a
large, state-owned enterprise often wields substantial influence over the
local Party leadership of other governmental organizations. The result is
that an enterprise issuing stock can often effectively evade civil liability
by using its guanxi74 to influence local government leadership and court

officials.'5
Another difficulty with enforcing civil awards in China is the
reluctance of local authorities to enforce judgments against a major
contributor to the regional economy.76 Should the local or regional
governments decide that enforcement of the award would unduly hamper
the local or regional economy, they may simply direct those under their
charge not to comply with the issuing court's request for enforcement. A
good example of this was the experience of a British company, which
received a favorable disposition of its case before an arbitration panel.
The company applied to the Beijing intermediate court 77 for enforcement
against a Ningxia7' company." Despite the repeated requests of the
Beijing court to the Ningxia intermediate court to enforce the award, the
Ningxia court refused to do so.8" Eventually, Beijing court personnel
paid a personal visit to Ningxia. Upon arrival, the court personnel were
told by local bank officials that the Ningxia company no longer retained
any substantial deposits at the bank (a statement that there was good
reason to believe was false), and the local Ningxia court also claimed the
amounts awarded by the Beijing court had been mis3calculated. 8' As a

73. P.R.C. Const. Preamble, art. 1; Zheng, supranote 61, at 559.
74. This term is Chinese for "relationships." A New Chinese-English Dictionary 364 (1985).
Building and cultivating personal relationships is a vital part of the social and political system in
China. An individual with good guanxi can often avoid much of the procedural red tape associated
with government administration.
75. Anthony Dicks, The Chinese Legal System: Reforms in the Balance, 119 China Q., 1989, at
565.
76. Matthew D. Bersani, supra note 63, at 47-48 (Although Eersani's article concerns
enforcement of arbitration awards, the same general principles regarding a Chinese court's ability to
enforce awards apply equally in this case).
77. In China, there are three levels of courts: basic level courts, intermediate courts, and highlevel courts. The intermediate court's jurisdiction generally extends to reviewing cases heard by the
basic level courts and to cases that are of particular significance to the local area in which they sit.
78. Ningxia Province is located in North-Central China.
79. Bersani, supra note 63, at 48.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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result, the plaintiff was left without a remedy despite the Beijing court
ruling to the contrary.8"
Even before judgment is rendered, however, there are strong
indications that the deck may be stacked against a plaintiff who is
making a securities fraud claim against an influential issuer. A judge's
decision in any given case can be overidden by the Adjudication
Committee" attached to each People's Court, even if the committee
members are not actually present during the courtroom proceedings at
the trial level.84 Because the Committee consists of appointed Party
officials, it may at times be influenced by political or economic factors.
Furthermore, although all levels of courts are in theory answerable to the
Supreme People's Court of China, their operating expenses and the
benefits of individual court personnel are controlled by local or regional
governments. Political pressure can therefore play a significant part in
influencing an individual judge's or an Adjudication Committee's final
decision.
In sum, the court system offers a very unreliable avenue for redress in
China. Indeed, most native Chinese hesitate before bringing any matters
before an official tribunal. An old Chinese maxim states, "Win your
lawsuit, lose your money."8" For the aggrieved shareholder, this means
that even if his or her complaint is heard, it may not be impartially
adjudicated or a judgment may not be actually enforced. This is a
substantial risk that many outside investors might think twice about
taking.
C.

ConstitutionalRestrictions on Ownership

1.

The Role of China's Constitution

Chinese constitutional law scholars have distinguished the role the
constitution plays in China from the role a constitution plays in Western
democracies.86 Unlike its Western counterparts, China's constitution,
though explicitly stating that it has the force of law, serves more as a
82. Id.
83. The Adjudication Committee's function is to oversee the judgements of the courts. Its
ostensible purpose is to make sure that the individual judge or panel does not make mistakes.
84. Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It? Legal Institutionsand Economic Reform in
China, 10 UCLA Pac. Basin L.L 1, 60-61 (1991).
85. Sybille Van der Sprenkle, Legal Institutions in Manchu China (1966).
86. For an excellent explanation of the form and purpose of China's Constitution, see William C.
Jones, The Constitution of the People's Republic ofChina, 63 Wash. U. L.Q. 707 (1985).
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policy statement of the government.8 7 Its revision is a signal that a
significant change has taken place in the government or in society and
that the change is perceived to be long-lasting."5 Consequently, while
many of these "policy" statements are not always binding as law, they do
give a good indication of the attitudes and goals of present leadership
and of the direction China may be expected to go in the future. In this
sense, policy is more important than law.89
As a result, China's current constitution does not define the rights and
responsibilities of the people and their government. 90 To secure
individual liberties, an effective constitution must be essentially
contractual, 9' in that it defines the relationships among individual
members of society and between the government and the citizenry. This
usually requires a limitation on rights of the individual as well as a
restraint on the power of government; "it must define with clarity the
basic structure of rights of society as a whole."92 Thus, one of the
principle shortcomings of China's current constitution is its failure to
define, in concrete terms, exactly what kind of rights are available to the
individual and how those rights will be protected from government and
private interference. To be sure, national and local statutes provide a
clearer picture of the restraints imposed upon government, but the
ambiguities inherent in the current and overriding constitution leave the
ultimate validity of these restraints in question.93
87. Id.
88. Id. For example, the first constitution promulgated in 1949 signified the victory of the
Communist forces over the Nationalists. The 1954 Constitution, which remained unchanged for
more than 20 years, signaled the firm entrenchment of the new regime and the stabilization of power
within China. The 1975 Constitution followed the victory of the "Gang of Four" faction over intraparty forces that opposed it throughout the Cultural Revolution. The 1978 Constitution resulted
from the overturning of the "Gang of Four" and signaled the establishm.nt of the coalition led by
Deng Xiaoping. Finally, the 1982 Constitution is said to "indicate a complete rejection of the
Cultural Revolution and all 'leftist' ideas and a return to the 'good old day3 of the 1950's."' Id.
89. "A clear statement of policy may, in consequence, be of considerably more value than a more
detailed set of rules. As a result, the preamble is generally the most important part of the
constitution. Thus, the statements in the preamble to the 1982 constitution that emphasize the
importance of modernization and the necessity to make use of foreign capital and almost to eliminate
class struggle may be rather more significant to a person who is contemplating a joint venture than a
whole portfolio of legal materials of the usual type." Id. at 474.
90. Steven N.S. Cheung, Will China go "Capitalist?," Hobart Paper 94, at 24. (1982)
91. Id.
92. Id. at 25.
93. One writer has concluded:
[O]ne major hindrance to China's going capitalist is a cumulative stock of resistance built on a
base of ambiguity and indoctrination. Communism in China has lon3 been bolstered by the
vagueness of its sloganism, by the hazy popular belief that the nature of 'capitalism' is
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2.

Shareholdingand the SocialistEconomy

Consequently, a final problem confronting those who hold shares in
Chinese enterprises is the fundamental conflict between a system of
stock ownership and the Marxist ideals perpetuated in China's most
recent constitution.94
Despite the Chinese constitution's specific
recognition of general property rights, there are provisions that seem to
conflict with the principle of stock ownership. For example, article 6
describes the basis of the economic system as "socialist public ownership
of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and
collective ownership by the working people."95 Moreover, this system of
public ownership "supersedes the system of exploitation of man by
man... ."96 If the constitution declares public ownership to be the basis
of China's economic system, it appears, in theory at least, that the
measures enacted by the national and local governments vesting private
individuals with the right to own shares of enterprises are per se
unconstitutional. Arguably, article 13, which provides for the protection
of "the right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses
and other lawful property"97' recognizes stock ownership, in that the
existence of various current securities regulations make ownership
"lawful" and therefore protected. However, on the whole, the status of
private stockholders in China is ambiguous.
This ambiguity of constitutional protections does not necessarily mean
that shareholders are in imminent danger of having their investments
expropriated. Nor does it mean that eliminating the conflicting provisions
from the constitution would immediately vest shareholders with a
blanket of security.98 Political and economic forces within China itself
wield great power to protect or destroy a stockholding system regardless
of the wording of its constitution. However, shareholders should focus
their concerns on the long-term implications of these ambiguities and

represented in the repeatedly told horror stories, and by the rhetoric enbalmed in the Chinese
Constitution itself.
Id.
94. The most recent P.R.C. Constitution was promulgated on December 4, 1982.
95. P.RC Constitution art. 6.
96. Id.
97. Id. at art. 13 (emphasis added).
98. See Nikos A.Stamos, China'sNascent SecuritiesMarket: Some Observations, 10 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y, 691, 697 n.26 (1987) (arguing that since 1954, the right to own income, savings, and
homes has been constitutionally protected, but that in practice, protection may have been less
consistent).
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their effect on China's economic reforms. As a whole, the constitution's
conflicting terms reflect the ongoing ambivalence of China's leadership
regarding market reforms. This ambivalence presents a hindrance to
further regulation and places the status of stock ownership on uncertain
ground. 99
Several commentators have made valiant efforts to reconcile the
existence of a stockholding system with a socialist economy.'
Some
commentators argue that shareholding is a natural step in the
development of a socialist economy. To illustrate their point, they note
the stockholding systems extant in several of the former Eastern Bloc
countries.''
A second group of theorists differentiates between stock ownership in
a capitalist economy and a socialist economy. In a capitalist economy,
the argument runs, the shareholders are bourgeois, living off the labors of
the working class; in a socialist economy, the owners of the shares are
communes, government collectives, or the individual workers within the
factory itself. This argument ignores the fact that many shareholders in
Chinese enterprises are foreigners who cannot be considered "workers"
or "the people" in any sense. It also fails to recognize that shareholders
in capitalist countries are often individual employees or pension funds
that represent employees.0 2
A third group argues that capitalist shareholders seek to exploit the
labor of the workers, whereas in the socialist system, shareholding is a
tool to meet the needs of the people. 3
However, even these
commentators must concede that China's current shareholding system is
driven by shareholders' desire for profits. 3 4 Finally, it is said that a

99. A good example of this ambivalence is the delay in promulgating a comprehensive national
securities law. The law was originally to have been enacted in January 1994. As of this writing, it is
still in draft form.
100. See, e.g., Stamos, supra note 98, at 694-96 (critiquing the varicus economic and political
arguments set forth by Chinese economists seeking to justify shareholding under China's socialist
system).
101. E.g,, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia; see, e.g., Yan Simao, PRC Journal Discusses
Socialist Joint Stock Companies, JPRS, Mar. 13, 1985, at 7; Li Kehua, Methods of Stock Issuance
Under Socialism Discussed, Nov. 20, 1985, at 35. It should be noted, however, that all these
countries are currently moving away from socialism.
102. Stamos, supranote 98, at 694-95.
103. Kehua, supra note 101, at 37. Presumably these needs are met by providing the necessary
capital for economic growth.
104. As one commentator has stated, "Seen from the long-term... people will see that purchasing
ordinary shares will be profitable." Cao Wenlian, Jingii Yanjiu on ChangingEnterprises to Stock
Companies,JPRS, Nov. 19, 1985, at 21, 26.
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system of checks and balances between the enterpise management, board
of directors, and the workers council will protect the workers,
government, and shareholders from being harmed by a shareholding
system." 5 Unfortunately, in practice these checks and balances are
unlikely to provide adequate protections because the party with the most
power (read "government") will prevail on almost any issue.
Consequently, the system of shareholding currently in place in China
faces many ideological and political obstacles. It is easy to dismiss these
apparent contradictions between private shareholding and socialist theory
by citing the fact that a shareholding system is continuing to be
developed despite the conflicts. However, long-term growth, stability,
and regulation of securities markets and of China's economy depend
upon reconciliation between these two principles.
III. DIVERSIFIED STATE OWNERSHIP: A PROPOSAL FOR
FURTHER REFORM
Any real solution to the problems of share ownership in China must
address both the ideological resistance and practical problems that exist
in China today. A program of diversified state ownership, whereby a
state entity's controlling interest in an enterprise is divided among
several separate state agencies and institutions, will maintain ideological
integrity while offering a solution to the problems facing China's
securities markets. Diversified state ownership was first discussed in a
1985 report by the World Bank Mission (WBM) to the Chinese
government.'0 6 In the report, the WBM examined various stock reform
policies implemented in China prior to 1983 and provided suggestions on
how reforms might fruitfully continue. The WBM believed that a
fundamental problem in the relationship between the state and the
enterprises still existed. 7 The state still maintained rigid control over
the state-owned enterprises, causing enterprises to be "subordinate
bodies of administrative organs"' 8 rather than functioning, independent
entities.
To address this problem of enterprise autonomy, the WBM advocated
the establishment of boards of directors vested with strategic decision-

105. Id.
106. World Bank, China:Long-Term DevelopmentIssues & Options (1985).
107. Id. at 164.
108. Id. at 165.
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making power. 9
These boards would consist of workers,
representatives of society at large, and, most importantly, representatives
of institutions with a strong interest in the enlerprise's profits."'
However, the WBM recognized that even semi-independent boards of
directors would be insufficient to ensure enterprise autonomy.
Accordingly, the WBM proposed that
[a] possible solution might be to spread the ownership of each state
enterprise among several different institutions, each in some way
representing the whole people, but with an interest mainly in the
enterprise's profits rather than directly in its output, purchases, or
employment. Examples of such institutions, in addition to central
and local governments, are banks, pension funds, insurance
companies, and other enterprises ....
In China, such a system of
socialist joint stock ownership could perhaps be created initially by
suitable dispersion of the ownership capital cf existing state
enterprises. Over time, it could be reinforced by a more diversified
pattern of investment finance, with a variety of state institutions
acquiring financial interests in existing and new enterprises."'
This proposal to diversify state ownership of enterprises offers a
concrete plan of reform that is consistent with socialist ideology and
provides shareholders with assurance of increased rights and protections.
A.

DiversifiedState Ownership Would Allow All ShareholdersTo
Exercise GreaterOversight of EnterpriseManagement andPolicies

The allocation of the state-owned portion of a given company among
separate state bodies would dilute the overall influence of any single
state entity upon the policies and management of the organization.
Because no corporate policy decisions or company directors could be
selected by a single majority shareholder, only those policies or directors
upon which all major stockholders could agree would be chosen. Most,
if not all of the time, the interests of these various entities would differ.
For example, a municipality's principal interest in an enterprise may be
its ability to provide employment for the local citizenry, while a
government agency in charge of heavy industry may be more interested
in providing inexpensive component parts for other projects. If both

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 166.
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state shareholders are to benefit, they must reach a consensus as to what
their goals for the enterprise are. It is likely that a strong common
interest would be profits. This interest would subsequently be reflected
in the types of directors selected to direct the enterprise, and the policies
they pursue. In this sense, the division of state assets among several
different state entities resembles the structure now existing in the United
States, where a large segment of stock in many major corporations is
held by institutional investors."'
Minority stockholders, that is,
individuals and smaller private investment groups, would be assured that
their interests are furthered because the shared interest of the state
shareholders is profits.
Additionally, diversified state ownership would necessarily bring
about greater adherence to the formalities of stockholder participation in
the enterprise. Although the current corporate law in China requires the
holding of shareholder meetings and confers voting rights,"' these
procedures are not consistently implemented by the enterprise." 4 State
organizations that have a primary interest in the enterprise's profits but
not a majority interest in the enterprise would demand a voice in
determining the enterprise's policies and in electing the enterprise's
board of directors so that they could more adequately protect their
investments. Moreover, state shareholders would have the ability to
apply sufficient political pressure to ensure that securities laws are
vigorously enforced, and outside investors would reap the benefits of
these actions.
B.

The Proposal Would Result in IncreasedProtection ofInvestors'
Interests

Another result of diversified state ownership is that each individual
state organization would demand more consistent protection for its
ownership interest. Under a system of state majority ownership in an
enterprise, incentive to protect minority investors against fraud is lacking
because the state itself is not a minority shareholder. Consequently,
although some antifraud provisions have been enacted, development of
further protections has been slow, and enforcement inconsistent.
112. Approximately 35% of all outstanding stock in the United States is held by institutional
investors. Henn, Law of Corporations486 n.8 (1988).
113. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
114. An owner with majority control over the enterprise and control over the enforcement of any
laws governing that enterprise's operations does not have a great deal of incentive to adhere closely
to procedural rules.
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Moreover, individual state institutional shareholders who have a
shared interest in the profits of an enterprise would be able to apply
significant political pressure to the central and loocal governments to
enhance the protections available and to increase enforcement actions.
Even the traditional impotency of Chinese courts to enforce judgements
would be reduced if state ownership was dispersed widely enough.
Because incentive to protect local enterprises would decline when a local
government's stake in those enterprises was diminished," 5 less political
and economic pressure would be applied to a court attempting to
adjudicate a claim based on the securities laws. As a result, protection
against fraud would increase for everyone-including outside investors.
C.

The ProposalIs Consistent with CurrentSocialistIdeology in
China as Embodied in the Chinese Constitution

There is little doubt that diversified state ownership has the potential
to reform the socialist ownership system; however, il:
is also evident that
such a proposal is still far short of complete privatization. If China is to
6
continue down a road of reform, it must do so cn its own terms."
Diversified state ownership allows ownership of "the means of
production" ' to remain in the all-encompassing hands of the state but
still to serve private interests by focusing state interests on profits, thus,
allowing enterprises to pursue plans consistent with this interest. The
result is a "baby step" toward privatization thai is politically and
economically safe yet provides needed stability and protection to ensure
the future growth of China's burgeoning financial markets.
IV. CONCLUSION
The future stability and growth of China's nascent securities markets
depend upon how well investors in those markets are protected. The
markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen have grown considerably over the
past several years and have been a strong source of the investment capital

115. For example, a local government would be more likely to support a judgment against a local
enterprise by a court in another region if the local government only own zd a small percentage of the
enterprise itself and felt confident that it would have the same protection provided for its holdings in
other regions.
116. Xu Jing'an of the China Economic System Reform Institute in Beijing stated, "The biggest
obstacle to the implementation of a share system is the resistance of traditional [communist] ideas."
Xu Jing'an, The Stock-Share System: A New Avenue for China's EconomicReform 223 (1986).
117. P.R.C. Const. art. 6.
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that China so desperately needs. However, unless China is willing to
allow enterprises more autonomy, it will find that this wellspring of
capital funds can quickly dry up. As a possible solution to the dilemma
posed by a socialist securities market, diversified state ownership would
leave primary control of enterprises in the hands of the state, while
allowing each enterprise to pursue goals that are more compatible with
outside investors' interests. By restructuring the ownership of China's
enterprises in this way, the integrity of socialist ideology would be
protected while the aims of capitalism were advanced. In the interim, it
is important for investors to remember that, in China, all that glitters is
not necessarily gold.
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